

The distinction between Islam and Muslims in the Dutch anti-Islamization discourse

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This article discusses the distinction, made by Dutch supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse, between Islam and Muslims, allowing them to say that they have a great deal against Islam, but nothing against Muslims. The main objective of this contribution is to analyze the Islam/Muslims distinction as it appears in this discourse and to describe its possible consequences for the people it concerns: Muslims living in the Netherlands. The article takes the writings of Dutch *Partij Voor de Vrijheid* (PVV; 'Party for Freedom') leader Geert Wilders and party ideologue Martin Bosma as cases in point and presents an analysis of their contents focusing on the Islam/Muslim distinction as an essential element in this anti-Islamization discourse. The article discusses the definition of the anti-Islamization discourse and links it to the term Islamization and the related term Islamophobia, and their manifestation in the discourse of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom. The article shows that this party aims at "luring" Muslims into renouncing Islam and thus creating a Netherlands without Islam, which is in fact a Netherlands without Muslims.

Key terms: Islam; Anti-Islamization discourse; Islamophobia; PVV (Party for Freedom); Geert Wilders; Martin Bosma.

1. Introduction

This article discusses the distinction that Dutch supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse make between Islam and Muslims. This allows them to say that they have a great deal against Islam, but nothing against Muslims. The central issue of this contribution is to analyze the Islam/Muslims distinction as it appears in this discourse and to describe its possible consequences for the people it concerns: the Muslims in the Netherlands. The article starts by presenting a brief description of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands and Europe (section 2). Section 3 contains a discussion of the meaning(s) of the terms 'Islamization' and 'anti-Islamization discourse', also in relation to the term

'Islamophobia'. Section 4 presents a brief description of the recent history of the anti-Islamization discourse in the Netherlands. Subsequently, the discourse itself is presented in an analysis of representative writings produced by its leading figures in the Netherlands, PVV (Party for Freedom) leader Geert Wilders and party ideologue Martin Bosma (section 5). After this, the article describes possible consequences of the Islam/Muslims distinction when it comes to a realization of what the anti-Islamization discourse considers a solution to the 'Islam problem' (section 6). Section 7 presents the results of polls on discrimination experienced by Muslims in the Netherlands, along with comparative studies. The article ends with conclusions and a discussion (section 8).

2. Muslims in the Netherlands

Assuming, as many people do, that Muslims in the Netherlands, or any other European country for that matter, all adhere to an identical level of religiosity is not merely hypothetical but simply incorrect. The latest report on Muslims in the Netherlands shows that while they do tend to be more religious than their Dutch neighbours, they nevertheless differ substantially among each other in terms of religiosity (Maliepaard & Gijssberts 2012). Thus, some 76% of Moroccan Muslims claim to pray five times a day against 27% of the Turkish Muslims (Maliepaard & Gijssberts 2012, 75). In France, 65% of the male Muslims and 85% of the female Muslims say they never go to the mosque at all (IFOP 2011). Apart from being more heterogeneous in terms of religiosity than is often supposed, Muslims in Europe do not form a homogeneous political community either. Thus, there is hardly any European country in which Muslims have succeeded in organizing and expressing themselves in one single national body, in spite of government efforts to encourage them to do so, to look after their interests and to act as a general representative contact for their community. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this. The Belgian government implemented legislation to the effects that Muslims should organize themselves in such a national representative body (Oulad Si M'Hamed 2007; Zemni 2005). The elections for this body were regarded with distrust by parts of 'the Muslim community' and the body as such was and still is hardly recognized by the various national and local Muslim associations and organizations. In France, similar differences occurred in the election of a national representative body of Muslims (Taras 2012). According to German authorities, the perceived unwillingness of the Muslims in their country, consisting mainly of people with a Turkish background, to organize themselves in one body with one voice constitutes a major stumbling block to the integration of 'the Muslim community' (Monsma & Soper 2009).

The Netherlands did not impose legislation on Muslims to organize themselves in a single body but this does not mean that we are dealing with a united community there either. Today the country numbers several 'representative' bodies of Muslims competing with each other for the government's attention. Given these wide differing levels of religiosity and the lack of organization in some kind of central representative body, we cannot really speak of 'the Muslim community' of any given European country. For clarity's sake therefore, the term 'Muslims', as used in this article, is to be interpreted as simply referring to persons with a Muslim background, who may or may not identify with Islam, and who may vary considerably in their levels of religiousness and the extent to which they are organized in representative bodies.

3. The anti-Islamization discourse, Islamization and Islamophobia

Given that this article speaks of the anti-Islamization discourse, it makes sense to relate it to the term Islamization. Furthermore, as the term anti-Islamization obviously implies opposition against Islam, it also makes sense to relate it to the term Islamophobia which shares to a certain extent the same implication. This section therefore describes the meaning of the three concepts and how they relate to each other. At the end of the section a definition of the anti-Islamization discourse is presented.

The idea behind the term Islamization originated in what would later be called the Wahhabi movement in Islam, which emerged in the eighteenth century in what is now Saudi Arabia. Its aim was to do away with innovations (Arabic: *bida'*) in Islam and to return to a pure and undiluted monotheism without the then current widespread adoration of saints, which they considered a reprehensible act of polytheism (Margoliouth 1974). In nineteenth century Egypt, the idea of Islamization was used by such reformers as Mohammad Abdoh (±1849-1905) and Jamal al Din al Afghani (1838/9-1897) in response to British colonial authorities that strove to Westernize Egyptian society. Muslims were urged to go back to their roots and embrace Islam more than they had ever done and to turn away from the West. Among present-day Muslim intellectuals and philosophers, some of them based in the West, Islamization has predominantly taken the form of revisiting methodologies of conducting research in social as well as exact sciences, resulting in widespread literature on concepts like the 'Islamization of knowledge', 'Islamization of social sciences', 'Islamic economics', 'Islamic education', and the like (Al-Atass 2006; Sardar 1985; Rahman 1988; Siddiqi 2001). These days Islamists use the term both inside and outside the Islamic world aiming at the (re-)Islamization of Islamic countries that have deviated, in their views, from the right path of Islam. It should be stressed here

that Islamists are primarily focused on (re-)Islamizing the Islamic world and the Muslims living outside it, practicing *da'wa*, preaching 'true' Islam, and that the Islamization of the Western world is being kept as an item on the agenda for future reference, to be accomplished – if ever – after the primary objective has been realized, as Wagemakers (2012) and De Koning (2012) point out. It will be clear therefore that, for the moment at least and probably for a long time to come, Muslims not eager to "Islamize" have much more to fear from supporters of Islamization than non-Muslims do.

After this brief discussion of the term 'Islamization' it is useful to dwell for a moment on the term 'Islamophobia' and how it relates to Islamization. The fear of Islam in the Western world is as old as Islam itself, as Taras (2012) and López (2012) correctly point out. The continued existence of movements striving for the Islamization of the Islamic world and the Muslims outside of it obviously has not helped to diminish this fear. In fact, it has led to an excessive fear of Islam better known these days as Islamophobia. There is as yet no generally accepted definition of the term, as López (2011) and Ciftci (2012) observe. The Runnymede report (1997), dealing with Islamophobia, distinguishes eight characteristics that, as Ciftci (2012, 295) observes, would appear to be the most comprehensive ones. According to the report, Islamophobia is characterized by the following views: (1) Islam is a monolithic bloc, unresponsive to change; (2) Islam is a separate "other"; (3) Islam is inferior to the West; (4) Islam is violent; (5) Islam is a political ideology used for political and military advantage; (6) Islam rejects criticism from the West; (7) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims; and (8) Hostility towards Muslims is seen as natural and normal. Esposito & Kalin (2011) follow the Runnymede Report in its description of Islamophobia. López presents the following definition: "Islamophobia denotes a hostile attitude towards Islam and Muslims based on the image of Islam as the enemy and as a vital, irrefutable and absolute threat to "our" wellbeing and even to "our" existence, irrespective of how Muslims are identified, whether on the basis of religious or ethnic criteria" (2012, 572).

In this article, the anti-Islamization discourse as it has developed in the Netherlands is the central issue. Basically, this anti-Islamization discourse is a reaction first of all to Islamization, and secondly to Islamophobia. The term Islamophobia was obviously not coined by people who themselves hold these negative views of Islam and Muslims. Those who hold such views reject the term, claiming that what they say about Islam is true and not fuelled by irrational fear, and that their critics are trying to play down the very real danger presented by Islam or that they are simply blind to the truth. A case in point is Dutch *Partij Voor de Vrijheid* ('Party For Freedom'; PVV) leader Geert Wilders. An illustration

of his thinking can be found in his book *Marked for Death. Islam's War Against the West and Me* (2012), in which he discusses the speech on Islam held by American President Obama in Cairo on June 4, 2009. In this speech, Mr. Obama declared that “he consider[ed] it part of [his] responsibility to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear” (13). Mr. Wilders’ response to this is: “What if these so-called “negative stereotypes of Islam” are the truth – will you denounce people for telling the truth?” (Wilders 2012, 13).

The supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse display all the characteristics of Islamophobia, but they choose to reject the term or at least ignore it. They resent the word being used in connection with their views and justify their words and actions by referring to what I call here the anti-Islamization discourse, which can subsequently be described as follows:

The anti-Islamization discourse claims that Muslims persistently strive to make a person, a group of people or a whole people or nation, irrespective of whether s/he or it originally is Muslim or not, embrace and practice the ideology (note: not religion) of Islam and apply Sharia. It claims that in all cases these endeavours result in the loss of freedom, the loss of possible democratic systems and the consequent repression of minority groups like women, homosexuals and adherents of other religions, like Christianity and Judaism. The discourse therefore strives to combat Islam (read: Muslims; see below) and seeks to make it disappear in the first place from the Western world, and in the end from the whole world.

No definition is exhaustive, but the one given here contains all the basic tenets of the anti-Islamization discourse as will be shown more in detail below. The supporters of the claim that Islam is getting more and more organized in the Western world jump at every opportunity they get to point at the violence ‘Muslims’ are practicing everywhere in the world to substantiate their claims (cf. Geller 2011; Bat Ye’or 2001; Solomon & Al Maqdisi 2012). The anti-Islamization discourse is gaining ground, becoming stronger and stronger, its ideas, be it in different measures, steadily filtering into the media, into politics and into people’s minds (Feffer 2012; Sheehi 2011; Taras 2012; Van der Valk 2012). This development is also taking place in the Netherlands.

It is important to observe that the anti-Islamization discourse claims to consider Islam an ideology and not a religion. Labeling Islam as an ideology prepares the way for equating it to other ideologies, the most common of which is fascism (see below), making it easier to condemn Islam as evil. Another consequence of labeling Islam as an ideology rather than a religion, particularly in the Dutch context, is that the supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse

assert that Islam can no longer claim the protection of freedom of religion (*godsdiens en levensovertuiging*) as offered in Article 6 of the Dutch constitution.¹ It is obviously a semantic game that is being played here, but the bottom line is that, according to the Dutch supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse, ideologies do not fall under article 6 of the Constitution, implying furthermore that, unlike religions, they should therefore not be supported, financially or otherwise, by the Dutch authorities.²

The anti-Islamization discourse emphatically refers to the violence committed in the name of Islam in the last few decades: the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the terrorist acts of Al Qaeda and, in the Dutch context, the assassination of film maker Theo van Gogh by the jihadist Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004, and the permanent protection of former MP Hirsi Ali of the VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*; 'People's Party for Freedom and Democracy'; a Liberal Conservative political party). These and many other events have reinforced the distrust that has been reigning for ages in the Western world against Islam and Muslims. It goes without saying that the blame of the acts perpetrated by individuals or specific groups cannot be laid on the whole community or communities of, in this case, Muslim people. We will see below that the supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse do not make this particular distinction.

4. Voices against Islam in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, VVD leader Frits Bolkestein was one of the first Dutch politicians who successfully mobilized public opinion against Muslims by juxtaposing "European civilization" – standing for liberalism, secularization, freedom of speech, nondiscrimination – with "the world of Islam" (Bolkestein 1991). Bolkestein argued that "the integration of minorities should be handled with toughness" (Prins 2002, 369). Although most Dutch political parties and intellectuals rejected Bolkestein's approach, he did break the Dutch taboo on migrant-hostile discourse in the public sphere (Ghorashi & Van Tilburg 2006, 63). Politician Pim Fortuyn was the first influential person who claimed that the "Islamization of Dutch society" was imminent, and the first to popularize the anti-Islamization discourse in Dutch politics and society. In his book *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur* ('Against the Islamization of Our Culture') (1997) Fortuyn claimed that the daily contact between "Islamic culture" and "traditional

¹ <http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvihlf299q0sr/vih9dp4hyqv1>.

² There is extensive literature on the meaning of the term 'ideology' (cf. Hawkes 2003), but in the present article ideology related to Islam is interpreted as the supporters of the Islamization discourse do.

Dutch culture” in Dutch multicultural society threatened to obliterate the latter. In early 2002, Fortuyn was dismissed as leader by his party *Leefbaar Nederland* (‘Livable Netherlands’), which would not stand for some of the statements that he made in a controversial newspaper interview, in which he repeated his earlier claims that the Netherlands was too full to admit any more migrants, that Islam was “a backward culture” and that it would be better to abolish “that weird article of the constitution: thou shalt not discriminate” (quoted in Prins 2002, 376 and in Ghorashi & Van Tilburg 2006, 64). In February 2002, Fortuyn established his own political party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) and within months gathered a substantial following based on an appealing taboo-breaking program, the main features of which were that it opened up the debate on the alleged “backward” culture of Islam and severely attacked the culture of political correctness and the absence of any ideology in the “purple” governments consisting of PvdA (Labour Party) and VVD (Liberal Conservatives) that had ruled the country since 1994. Fortuyn was shot dead by an animal activist on 6 May 2002. It was the first political murder in the Netherlands literally in centuries and it came as a great shock to the whole population. Fortuyn was assassinated only 9 days before the national elections took place on the 15th of May, when his new party the LPF won a landslide in Dutch politics, winning 26 of the 150 seats, at once becoming the second largest party in the country. The party went on to form a coalition government with the CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl; the Christian Democrats) and the VVD, an ill-born and as it turned out ill-fated government that did not make it beyond the first 100 days. Soon afterwards Fortuyn’s Party went into decline due to internal conflicts until it ceased to exist in 2008.

In many ways, Wilders picked up where Fortuyn left off. In 1998 Wilders was elected MP for the VVD, but he left the party in 2004, due to an internal conflict on the admission of Turkey to the European Union, which Wilders opposed, to start his own, first under the name *Groep Wilders* and since 2006 under the name *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV; ‘Party for Freedom’). Since 2004, Geert Wilders has been constantly warning against “the Islamization of the Netherlands”. Wilders claims the following: “The Netherlands must be protected against the import of Islamic culture, which will wipe out our tolerance and our democracy” (2005, 66); Islam “is a political ideology, a totalitarian doctrine aimed at dominance, violence, suppression, and the introduction of Sharia law (...) Islam strives for world domination” (2007, 13); “the fight against Islam should be the core of Dutch foreign policy” (2007, 43); Islam is “diametrically opposed to freedom, [there is] not a centimeter of space for Islam in the Netherlands” (2012a, 26). Wilders supported the first minority cabinet of VVD Prime Minister Mark Rutte, consisting of VVD and CDA, after his party had won a

major victory in the June 2010 elections, landing 24 seats in Parliament. In April 2012, however, Wilders decided to no longer support the government, claiming that he could not live with the major cuts it suggested on social welfare and the like. In the subsequent elections of September 2012 his party lost nine seats. It had not only lost seats, it also lost its direct influence on government policies, not just because it was smaller now, but more importantly because it was no longer considered a reliable and loyal partner by the only parties that would consider working with them. Still, the party's voice can still be heard loud and clear and its mission to spread its message regarding the evil nature of Islam is far from over. Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom can be regarded as the Dutch bearers par excellence of the anti-Islamization discourse as described above.

There has been considerable opposition to Wilders' and his party's anti-Islamization rhetoric, not only in parliament but also outside it. He has had to defend himself in court, being charged with incitement to hatred and discrimination against Muslims in his statements in interviews, speeches and in Parliament. On 23 June 2011, the court acquitted him of all charges, considering that from a formal judicial point of view he was criticizing Islam and the behavior of Muslims, but not Muslims themselves (Rozemond 2012). The court did mention in its verdict that certain statements by Wilders, such as "a tsunami of Muslims threatening the country", were "rude and condescending". With regard to these and other statements, the court stated: "These are statements bordering on the impermissible. They are seditious." However, the acquittal encouraged party leader Wilders to continue expressing himself in negative terms on Islam.

5. The contents of the Dutch Islamization discourse

The Party for Freedom is thus characterized by a strong anti-Islam discourse. But like any political party the Party for Freedom had to develop viewpoints on numerous other topics as well. When it comes to social security the party developed a center left program where it stands up for the "man in the street". The party opposes the dismantling of the welfare state. That was also the reason why it decided to no longer support the Rutte government in April 2012 (see above). The party furthermore focuses heavily on the recovery of the Dutch nation state and is categorically against the European Union and the euro currency. The party carries an uncompromising policy for Israel and for the full emancipation of homosexuals. Given these facts it is not easy to characterize the party politically, as stated by Vossen (2013), who wrote an excellent overview of the history and political development of the Party for Freedom. Concerning socio-economic and ethical issues it can be labeled as center left, but it when it

comes to the issue of the Netherlands as a nation state and its position in international politics it can be labeled as right wing. The party's preference for Christian values (see below) does not make it a traditional Christian party. The party structure is that of an association with only one member and that is Geert Wilders himself. There is no party office, there is no think-tank and there is no youth movement. It is unclear how the party is financed, although there are persistent rumours that American right-wing funds and possibly Jewish organizations in the United States would support it.

The anti-Islamization discourse fits in an ideology that focuses on other issues as well and the Party for Freedom's ideology is no exception to that rule. In this section, an overview will be presented of what this ideology stands for. The overview is based on an analysis of a book written by Party for Freedom ideologue Martin Bosma, titled *De schijn-élite van de valsemunters. Drees, extreem rechts, de sixties, nuttige idioten, de groep Wilders en ik* ('The fake elite of the counterfeiters. Drees, the extreme right, the sixties, useful idiots, the Wilders group and I'; 2010), and on party leader Wilders' book *Marked for Death. Islam's War Against the West and Me* (2012), which was mentioned above (De Ruiter 2012a, 2012b).

The ideology of the Party for Freedom is characterized by a strictly applied good-evil structure. Bosma takes the Biblical verse of Isaiah 20:5 as a starting point: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter." With this verse in mind, the ideology of the Party for Freedom regards Christianity, Jews and Israel, and monoculturalism as *good*, whereas Islam, leftist political parties and multiculturalism are considered *evil*. There are hardly any exceptions to the rule. Below, all these are discussed in more detail.

Christianity

Bosma puts his vision of Christianity in the following words: "There are not many other things that Dutch people should be happier about than the Christian origins of our country. Nearly all of our crucial assets have a relationship with Christendom: democracy, separation of church and state, tolerance and also values like discipline and efficiency" (Bosma 2010, 94). Basically his point of view is that Christianity has given the Dutch everything that is good in our society. Christianity stands for moral values. It gave the Dutch democracy, the separation of church and state and tolerance.

The following quote is unequivocal about where Wilders stands in regard to what can be considered the best possible culture in the world. When

³ Willem Drees (1886-1988), former Labour Prime-Minister (1948-1958) of the Netherlands, is generally considered to be the founder of the Dutch welfare state.

discussing Western civilization Wilders states: “When you compare the West to any other culture that exists today, it becomes clear that we are the most pluralistic, humane, democratic, and charitable culture on earth” (Wilders 2012, 31). In specifying his claim further he refers to the West as a “Judeo-Christian civilization”. Wilders claims Western culture is superior to all other cultures.

It goes without saying that the claim that Judeo-Christian or Western civilization is superior to all other cultures in the world is at least debatable. Where democracy is concerned, history teaches us that it was brought about in spite of Christianity rather than thanks to it. It was Enlightenment thinking that ultimately brought about the concept of the equality of men, which led to a system of representation that eventually resulted in a democratic system in Western European countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Blom 2004). Christian political parties had to accept the fact that the church was no longer in charge (as it was before the French revolution) and that it had to compete for power with non-confessional forces.

A remarkable aspect of Wilders’ claim that Western culture and civilization are the best in the world today is that he hardly ever mentions it as an independent statement. This creates the impression that the claim cannot be substantiated on its own, and the fact that it is always mentioned in relation to Islam, systematically referred to as “evil”, does not add to its force either. To illustrate the alleged superiority of Western culture Wilders deals with the creation of the state of Israel. He reports on the migration to Israel of Jewish communities living in Arab countries after it was founded in 1948. Wilders labels them refugees and states that “[n]o one talks about the Jewish refugees anymore because they quickly made new lives for themselves in Israel, Europe and America, even though many of them had arrived penniless” (Wilders 2012, 82). Wilders wants to make it clear that there is no point in dwelling on the past. His motto is ‘Look to the future’. He also mentions “the Germans who were expelled from the Sudetenland and the lands east of the Oder and the Neisse rivers, the Greeks who were expelled from the Aegean coasts of Anatolia” (Wilders 2012, 82) and other such cases. All of these people were prepared to let bygones be bygones and got on with their lives. He then makes the comparison with Palestinian refugees: Islamic and Arab countries, he claims, seem to be eternally postponing a solution to the issue of the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967. What keeps the Palestinians from permanently settling down and getting integrated in countries like Lebanon, Syria and Jordan? Why do these governments refuse to settle things, like the Jews once did, and the Germans and the Greeks? This, Wilders observes, has to do with “a strong characteristic of Islam: it nurtures resentment, passing it on from generation to generation” (Wilders 2012, 82). “Islam”, he continues, “still complains about the Crusades, as

if France would still moan about the Hundred Years' War..." (Wilders 2012, 82). In short, unlike the Islamic world, the West shakes off the dust of the past and moves forward into the future.

Now we would agree that at some point one has to come to terms with the past, however difficult that might be. But is this mentality of being prepared to leave things behind you, forgetting about the past, letting bygones be bygones, indeed a specifically Western characteristic, as Wilders would have us believe? A few examples illustrate that old sores cannot be gotten rid of so easily. What about the German people who once lived in what are now Western Poland and the former Sudetenland? How good are they at accepting their new reality, at forgiving and forgetting? How come there are numerous associations whose members long for the days when their ancestors were still living in these regions? An even more telling example is the tragedy of Northern Ireland. How long has it taken before the people of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic accepted the partitioning of the island in 1922? Is it not another example that flatly contradicts this presumed Western spirit of forgetting about the past and moving on, as it took thirty years of bloodshed and more than 3,000 dead before finally a fragile peace was established? It will be clear that a lot can be said about the perceived superiority of Western or Christian culture. Academically, the arguments are easy to counter, but as Wilders and his party are political entities, the facts are the least of their concerns. Regardless of proof to the contrary, they hold on to their point of view on the alleged superiority of Western culture.

Jews and Israel

When dealing with the creation of the state of Israel, Wilders explains why he "always feel(s) at home in Israel: it is animated by the same spirit that made Western civilization great – that of the soldier protecting the frontier and the pioneer settling the land" (Wilders 2012, 84). In the lines preceding this sentence Wilders writes: "Their [the Jewish settlers'] spirit is the spirit of the West, the spirit of the pioneers who settled America and spilt "their blood ... in acquiring lands for their settlement," as Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1774" (Wilders 2012, 84). Israel is for Wilders an example of that Western superior spirit. Remarks in the same vein can be found in Bosma's book as well, for instance where he tells his readers that he bought "the biggest Israeli flag on the market of Tel Aviv" that he could find and hung it in his Parliamentary office in The Hague, in the window "so that the people outside will also know that this is a liberated area" (Bosma 2010, 219). Examples of other liberated areas, according to Bosma, are Jerusalem, and Judea and Samaria, all of which conquered from Arab nations, once again belong to the continent of freedom, or in Bosma's own words, "Israel has grown into the one and only symbol of freedom and the wish to continue

this freedom” (Bosma 2010, 274). “In this vein the flag of Israel is the flag of all free people” and “the country is the barometer of our future... Were the armies of Hamas and Hezbollah to march through the streets of Tel Aviv, Amsterdam and Paris would irreversibly be lost” (Bosma 2010, 275). In short, if Israel perishes, Europe will perish with it. It is Bosma as well who claims that the larger part of the Dutch Jewish community cherishes the Party for Freedom, more or less implying that the majority of the Jews would vote for it in an election.

It does not come as a surprise that the positive view of the Jews and Israel is very much inspired by their perceived common enemy: Islam or Muslims. In spite of their sharing a common enemy, however, polls and analyses of election results show that Bosma’s claims are in no way substantiated by the facts, and that instead the contrary is the case. The Amsterdam-based *Information and Documentation Centre Israel* (CIDI) in a poll of its own showed that in the 2010 elections not more than 2% of the Jewish community voted for the Party for Freedom, which ultimately obtained 15.5% of the total vote (CIDI 2010). Furthermore, the perceived positive attitude of the party towards the Jews got a big blow when in June of 2011 it decided to support a parliamentary bill to abolish Muslim and Jewish ritual slaughtering, much to the chagrin of the Jewish community in the Netherlands (De Ruiter 2012a). While the influence of animal activists within the party cannot be ruled out, and the implied cruelty to animals may thus have been a genuine consideration, one cannot help but suspect that they were so keen on cutting this prerogative of the Muslims in the Netherlands that they sacrificed the perceived allegiance of the Jewish community with it by deciding in favor of the bill. In the end the bill did not make it past the Senate, being rejected by the Liberal Conservatives (VVD) and the Social Democrats (PvdA).

What the political position on this particular issue demonstrates, however, is that the pro-Jewish attitude of the Party for Freedom must be regarded as being at least opportunistic in character and falling under the old adage of the enemies of my friends being my enemies too, except that in this case they forgot to ask their friends if they agreed.

Leftist political parties and multi- and monoculturalism

In discussing the issues of mass immigration and multiculturalism, Bosma (2010) puts the blame for their alleged disastrous consequences squarely on left-wing political parties. He states that it is these parties that opened up the borders to non-Western (read: Islamic) migrants, that facilitated their stay and are still facilitating the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. His argumentation is an impressive example of fact-free politics, because if we take a look at the actual and factual development of mass

immigration and multiculturalism in the country, a completely different picture emerges. The fact is that what Bosma and Wilders call mass immigration started in the second half of the sixties and continued until the end of the eighties. However, it was center-right governments, consisting of Christian Democrats and Liberal Conservatives that, to accommodate companies in want of cheap unskilled labour, authorized these companies to recruit labourers from countries like Morocco and Turkey. In the period from 1965 to 1989, the Netherlands had only one center-left government, which ruled the country from 1973 to 1977, and of all governments during that period this was the only one that regarded labour migration as a threat to existing labour relations in the country. In short: the borders of the country were opened to migrants by center-right governments and not by center-left ones (Lucassen 2005). Still the claim that it is the Left that is responsible for the alleged disastrous consequences of non-Western labour migration and the ultimate establishment of the multicultural society seems ineradicable, not only within the Party for Freedom. To this day it is bon ton to vent this opinion in most center-right political parties, and also in the media and to the general public.

Concerning the integration and adaptation of immigrants coming from non-Western Islamic countries Wilders states in the last chapter of his book that such immigrants should adapt to Western values, and abide by Western laws. Or in his words: "If you subscribe to our laws and values, you are welcome to stay and enjoy all the rights our society guarantees" (Wilders 2012, 214). But he also presents the consequences if "you" do not adapt and abide by these laws: "If you commit crimes, act against our laws, or wage *jihad*, you will be expelled" (Wilders 2012, 214). Mind that Wilders does not say that such people are to be jailed and/or fined. No, they are to be expelled, whereas normally in a democratic state no one is expelled for breaking the national law. Apparently there are two different judicial systems operating here, one for 'us' and one for 'them'.

A bewildering comparison is often drawn by Wilders and his peers between Islam and leftist political parties, on the one hand, and Nazism, on the other. For example, in the respective cases of Wilders and Bosma, the former gives one of the chapters of his book the title *Islamofascism* and the latter has a chapter bearing the title *Adolf Hitler, socialist*. Endless are the references to Nazism, the Holocaust and fascism in general in both writers' publications. Bosma claims that contemporary leftist parties are the actual heirs of Hitler's political party, the NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker's Party). Consequently, a modern political party like the Dutch *Partij van de Arbeid* (Labour Party), led between April 2010 and February 2012 by Jewish ex-mayor of Amsterdam Job Cohen, stands in the same line as Hitler's NSDAP. For those who

can hardly believe that the authors are being serious here, we refer to the Party for Freedom Election Program of 2010, where it says that each year on the fourth of May, the date at which the Germans signed the capitulation agreement in 1945, the Netherlands commemorate “the liberation from the (national) socialist occupation” (1940-1945). The site, which is no longer online, puts the word *national* in parentheses, implying that the Netherlands suffered from five years of *socialist* occupation and terror. Rewriting history this way, the PVV makes it possible to claim that it was the Left that caused the Second World War, and is still to this day responsible for everything that’s wrong with our society in the form of the modern-day Left like the Dutch Labour Party.⁴

In his chapter three, entitled *Islamofascism*, Wilders claims that the Nazis recognized in Islam “a kindred soul” (Wilders 2012, 42). Albert Speer, Nazi Germany’s Minister of Armament and Hitler’s *Reichsarchitect* supposedly wrote in his diaries that Hitler regretted that the prophet Mohammed had not come to the Germans and he quoted Adolf Hitler as saying: “It’s been our misfortune to have the wrong religion. Why did it have to be Christianity with its meekness and flabbiness?” (Speer 1969, 42; translation by Wilders). It is true that Adolf Hitler in his inner circle condemned Christianity for its meekness. In his politics, however, he did not go so far as to ban Christianity from society. But the full quote puts quite a different angle on the matter, when we read the part that has been left out: “It’s been our misfortune to have the wrong religion. Why don’t we have that [religion] *of the Japanese*, who consider sacrificing themselves for their country as the ultimate honor? The Mohammadan religion too would have been much more suitable than Christianity of all religions, with its meekness and flabbiness” [my italics]. Hitler supposedly implied that any religion would have been better than Christianity, possibly suitable candidates being the Japanese religion or Islam. The correct interpretation of Hitler’s quote would therefore have to be that he felt Christianity was too soft and weak; not so much that he admires Islam but rather that he would have preferred it or any other ‘heroic’ religion to Christianity.

Finally, both Wilders and Bosma condemn multiculturalism. In Bosma’s words: “We are going to speak out *against* Islam. *Against* the multicultural

⁴ This same line of reasoning led Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik to his atrocious acts in the bombing of Oslo’s government headquarters and the killing of 77 people, the majority of them young members of the ruling Social Democratic party, reasoning that it is the Left that causes the Islamization of Norway and Europe. The ideology of Mr. Breivik, as expressed in his 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, shows a disturbing resemblance with the Islamization discourse: anti Leftist parties, pro- Christianity and an opportunistic attitude towards Jews and the state of Israel. When asked for a response to Breivik’s declaration, the PVV denied any link between its own thinking and Breivik’s (De Ruiters 2011).

project and for an immigration stop from Islamic countries” (Bosma 2010, 37; italics Bosma’s). They praise the achievements of monoculturalism, or as Bosma puts it: “Monoculturalism has, together with Christian-Western values like assiduity, discipline, honesty and efficiency, resulted in an unprecedented climax in human history. It has given mankind everything it could have ever wished for” (Bosma 2010, 187). Bosma fails to give a definition of what monoculturalism is exactly, just as he fails to give arguments why it has been so beneficial to mankind. He does refer to the ‘fact’ that monocultural states hardly wage wars, and that if they do, it is certainly not against each other, easily forgetting that if asked for a correct and honest appraisal, the supposedly monocultural (according to Bosma) United States since 1941 would have to be classified as a belligerent rather than a peaceful nation.

6. Islam and Muslims: the solution

Wilders regards Islam as an ideology: “... Islam is not just a religion, as many Americans believe, but primarily a political ideology in the guise of a religion” (Wilders 2012, 25). “[T]he political ideology of Islam is not moderate – it is a totalitarian cult with global ambitions” (Wilders 2012, 26). If Islam is an ideology, its followers cannot be said to be believers. Still, Wilders never refers to Muslims as being adherents of an ideology. He does not give them a new name like ‘Islam ideologists’ for instance. He goes on calling them Muslims but obviously for him the term Muslim has a different meaning than it has for the average reader, who regards Muslims as adherents of a religion. The confusion only grows when we learn that Wilders makes a distinction between Islam on the one hand and its followers, the Muslims, on the other and even among Muslims. He states that “there are many moderate Muslims, but that does not change the fact that the political ideology of Islam is not moderate. ... We are fortunate that the majority of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims do not act according to the Koran...” (Wilders 2012, 26). Islam is evil; Muslims who do not fully implement Islamic ideology are not necessarily evil, so it seems. But if we read Wilders’ chapters 5 and 6 on the history of Islam, and the last chapter where he presents his view on the (future) path to follow in respect to Islam (see below), one notices that where he speaks of ‘Islam’, he cannot but mean ‘Muslims’. When he claims that Islam with its *jihad* caused the deaths of millions of people in India (Wilders 2012, 89), a justified question to him would be: “Who, in your opinion, was it that killed in India? Was it Islam? Or was it Muslims?”

In a subsequent historical example that Wilders gives of aggressive Islam, we notice a slip of the pen. In his historical overview of Islam, he refers to the fall of Alexandria in 640 AD. “Islam had little consideration for science” and thus “the Arabs ... deliberately burned down its 900-year-old library” (Wilders 2012,

55). Wilders here quotes the Arab leader, Caliph Omar: “They [the books] will either contradict the Koran, in which case they are heresy, or they will agree with it, so they are superfluous” (Wilders, 2012, 55). There are some interesting observations to be made with regard to the example of the book burning in Alexandria. Wilders starts by saying that “Islam had little consideration for science”, but he subsequently uses the word “Arabs”, which can only mean ‘Muslims’, to refer to the persons who executed the actual burning, instead of opting for a passive construction like “and the [...] library was deliberately burned down”. Here we encounter the consequences of the artificial distinction Wilders makes between Islam and Muslims. Islam is evil, Muslims are not necessarily, but in fact according to Wilders it was Muslims that spread the evil ideology of Islam and it was Muslims (apparently) that burned the books in the Library, not Islam – it could not be, as Islam is not a living person. If you are out to find blame, it is impossible to blame Islam and not blame the bearers of Islam, the Muslims. Therefore, the distinction between Islam and Muslims as proposed by Wilders is ultimately untenable. Ideologies do not kill. It is people who kill. He does not reject an ideology. He rejects people, Muslims.

In the context of this Islam/Muslim distinction, Wilders in the last chapter of his book presents a solution for the precarious ‘Islam problem’. The title of this chapter speaks for itself: *How to turn the tide*. Having established in the twelve preceding chapters of his book the evil character of the would-be religion of Islam, its devastating effects on the history of the world and the threat it poses to world peace today, it is now time to come up with a solution. The seventeen pages of this final chapter present Wilders’ view on “how to turn this tide” and of the different parts of the solution the following is the most telling: “Muslims must defeat Islam” (Wilders 2012, 212). Here we find both key words of the Islam/Muslim distinction in one sentence. And here lies the key as well for its deconstruction. For Wilders, Islam is not to be regarded as a religion; it is, under all circumstances, an aggressive ideology that seeks to conquer the world. People who follow this ideology are Muslims. But a real Muslim, in Wilders’ eyes, is one that follows the tenets of Islam and complies with what these require him to do in the full devastating sense of the word. Those who do not strictly and fully follow them are in fact no longer Muslims in the true sense of the word. This then is the answer to the question why Wilders does not assign a new term to Muslims who are not fully ‘observant’. A real Muslim is the one who acts in full compliance with the aggressive ideology of Islam. Those who do not do so are in fact not Muslims or are so no longer. In Wilders’ own words: “People who reject Islam’s violent, intolerant, and misogynistic commandments may be moderates, but they are not practicing “moderate Islam” – they are not practicing Islam at all” (Wilders 2012, 212). Before considering this statement in

some more detail, we might ask ourselves what would be the impact if “Muslims” were to actually “defeat” Islam? Wilders has the answer: “If they [Muslims] could liberate themselves from the yoke of Islam, if they would stop taking Muhammad as a role model, and if they got rid of the hateful Koran, they would be able to achieve amazing things” (Wilders 2012, 212). Earlier in the book he states: “If only they could liberate themselves from Islam, they, too, could become prosperous and free nations” (Wilders 2012, 65). So they are to renounce the Koran and renounce following the example of the prophet Mohammed. The Koran and the Prophet Mohammed are two key elements in Islam. If you take away the Koran, and do away with the Prophet, what would Muslims be left with? To what can they cling in order to live their lives as they believe they should if there is no longer a Holy Book and no (Holy) Prophet? Would they really be inclined to do so just because Wilders says that “in liberating themselves from Islam, they will ensure a happier life for themselves and their children, and a safer, more peaceful world for the rest of us” (Wilders 2012, 212)? Now we can also understand the impossibility of answering the question why moderate Muslims, who according to Wilders are in fact not Muslims at all, should “defeat Islam”. Wilders’ ‘solution’ of renouncing the Koran and the Prophet cannot but apply to *all* Muslims as for all Muslims the Koran and the Prophet are essential. The distinction between Islam and Muslims, and the sub-distinction between moderate (or so-called non-practicing) and extremist (or: real) Muslims is made only to ultimately lure *all* Muslims into accepting the solution to renounce Islam and thus create a Netherlands without Islam, which is in fact a Netherlands without Muslims.

7. Muslims in the Netherlands: experiences of discrimination

This section presents the results of polls on discrimination that Muslims in the Netherlands experience, along with comparative studies. Van der Valk (2012) gives an excellent overview of recent polls and studies that show that Muslims in the Netherlands are more and more regarded as “not integrated” and a “liability” to the safety of the country and its wellbeing. The SCP report on Muslims in the Netherlands (Maliapaard & Gijsberts 2012) devotes a separate chapter to Muslims’ experiences of discrimination related to their religion. It shows that 63% of Turkish Muslims and 80% of Moroccan Muslims find that “people in the Netherlands are much too negative about Islam” (51). When asked if they had personally experienced discrimination, 11% of the Turkish Muslims and 9% of Moroccan Muslims say they had. Around a quarter of both groups had heard of cases of other Muslims being discriminated against. Nearly 30% of the Turkish Muslims and nearly 20% of the Moroccan Muslims claim that this discrimination is inspired by religious motives, i.e., by anti-Islam attitudes.

The SCP report also refers to what is known as the *integration paradox*: those who have best integrated, in this case, in the Netherlands, experience the social climate as least positive (Gijsberts & Vervoort 2009).

Framing Islam as a threat is more and more in evidence in the Dutch media and, to a lesser extent, in Dutch politics. Roggebrand & Vliegenthart report on an analysis they made of documents that were presented and discussed in the Dutch Parliament between 1995 and 2004 and articles that appeared in the same period in five leading Dutch newspapers. With the help of digital analysis software they examined the documents on diverse frames, one of them being “the Islam-as-Threat frame”. In Parliament and more so in the media, the attention paid to issues of immigration and integration grew significantly in the period under investigation. The Islam-as-Threat frame turned out to be particularly strong in the media, but less so in the political realm, or in the words of Roggebrand & Vliegenthart: “Since 2002 a frame that points to Islam as a threat and an obstacle to integration has become dominant” (543). They add to that: “It is mainly right-wing parties that promote the Islam-as-Threat frame, whereas left-wing parties continue to support emancipation and multicultural frames” (543).

Siebers (2010) indicates that there is a large degree of convergence between migrant-hostile voices like Geert Wilders’ and everyday practice in carrying out Dutch government policies with regard to migrants. These are voices and policies that increasingly fit the concept of ethnic cleansing. The authors of the study propose using the concept of low-intensity ethnic cleansing to capture the increasingly militaristic way in which these policies and voices are framed. Furthermore Siebers & Dennissen (2012) prove convincingly that Muslim people in the context of their work are facing the dark consequences of the prevailing anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands. In their study, they show that statements made in Dutch politics and the Dutch media by people like Geert Wilders trigger discussions among colleagues at work, between majority, i.e., Dutch, colleagues reproducing these statements and employees with a Muslim and Moroccan background having to or feeling the need to defend themselves. Wilders’ stigmatizing discourse is often reflected in these discussions, which eventually fuel acts of discrimination and result in exclusion of colleagues with a Moroccan and Islamic background.

It can be argued that the results of the SCP poll and the increasing influence of the Islam-as-Threat frame can be directly related to the anti-Islamization discourse. This argument is confirmed by the large scale survey of Cesari (2012) on Muslims in the liberal democracies, as she calls them, in Western Europe, where she writes about an “existential war” that “manifests

itself in the political distinction (in Western Europe) between good and bad Muslims..." (Cesari 2012, 141).

8. Conclusions and Discussion

The court that acquitted Geert Wilders from charges of inciting hatred against Muslims used the Islam/Muslims distinction as one of the arguments to support its decision. It argued that Wilders was criticizing Islam, but not necessarily Muslims, and took into consideration the fact that in a democracy MPs are entitled to say what they want. Still, there is quite a difference between the judicial application of the distinction by the court and the practice engaged in by the followers of the Party for Freedom and its leader, as was duly recognized by the court when it criticized the insulting nature of the words Wilders uses in speeches and publications, thus signaling to the public that it condemned the manner in which he expresses himself with regard to Muslims. The mechanism of distinguishing between an evil or a religion, on the one hand, and its followers or adherents, who are not necessarily as evil as the ideology or the religion, on the other hand, is not a new phenomenon. In his seminal work *The End of Faith. Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason*, Harris (2004) meticulously describes the illogical nature of the holy scriptures of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in particular and how they left and still leave their bloody imprints on human history. As for the adherents of these three religions, he distinguishes between the orthodox believers who believe every single word of their scriptures and the so-called moderates who accept the achievements of modernity and try to reconcile modernity and faith. With their open attitudes towards modernity and reason, they, willingly or not, maintain the tenets of their religion. Furthermore, labeling Muslims as moderates is, as Harris claims, quite an overstatement because "even "moderate" approaches to Islam generally consider the Koran to be the literal and inerrant word of the one true God" (Harris 2004, 110). Nevertheless Harris is open in his analysis and does not hide behind a 'religion/ideology' versus 'adherents' distinction. He applies an academically consistent way of thinking and judging. His approach is neutral and not aimed at political gain. He expresses his views on all three monotheistic religions and their adherents and, rather than solely condemning Islam and Muslims, he criticizes each of them, each for specific reasons, while the anti-Islamization discourse condemns Islam and in the end all Muslims, while praising the blessings of Judaism and Christianity. The anti-Islamization discourse is completely politically inspired, and not interested at all in such objective considerations. In the Islam/Muslims distinction it is postulated that in principle all Muslims are potentially dangerous for the stability of society. Although the fight is presented as being aimed at an ideology rather than at people, there is little if any

sympathy for flesh-and-blood Muslims in the anti-Islamization discourse. The main reason a distinction is made between ideology or religion and its adherents is to legitimize the fight as being one against an evil force which unfortunately takes possession of people, turning them into victims without them knowing it. It is done to preclude allegations of discrimination, and with time, as the general public gets used to it, allow it to slowly get watered down in order to eventually reach its goal, which in this case is an 'Islam-free' and thus 'Muslim-free' Netherlands, and an 'Islam – and Muslim – free' Western world altogether.

The trial against Wilders proved that the legitimizing distinction has indeed had the desired effect. He was acquitted of hatemongering, of all legal charges against him, a verdict that allowed him to continue expressing his views. In the many statements he has made after his acquittal, in the press and the social media, he continues to employ the Islam / Muslim distinction, as do many of his followers. Polls and studies, a number of which were presented above, show that discrimination of Muslims in the Netherlands is on the rise as is the framing of Islam as a threat, particularly in the media. .

Leaving aside the legal verdict in the Wilders case, one might wonder if making and expressing a distinction between Islam and Muslims is acceptable when looked at from another angle. It might be argued, and this is basically what the court said, that it falls under free speech. But how would we feel about it if the distinction were part of a government program, and the objective, like that of Wilders, to fight the one, Islam, and not the other, Muslims, were actually to be carried out in such a program?

The first important observation regarding the Islam/Muslim distinction is that it gives both the Muslims, who are after all the center of attention of the anti-Islamization discourse, and the general public, the impression that the objective is to combat Islam and not the persons representing Islam, the Muslims. As we have seen, the distinction is artificial and practically untenable. If a government policy were to be applied based on this distinction it could not but result in putting pressure on Muslims to either renounce their religion or leave the country, a measure that would have to be dismissed as ethically unacceptable. A modern democratic government would never want to push people to renounce what is part of their very essence: their religion.

Taking this into consideration, the second important observation that can be made with regard to the Islam/Muslims distinction is that – even if the court decided otherwise – there is really no way round concluding that it is also a violation of the first article of the Dutch Constitution, which reads as follows: “Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted”, and of article 6, referred to above as well: “Everyone has the right to his religion or belief, either

individually or in community with others, to profess it freely, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law.” Even if one chooses to consider Islam as an ideology, its followers would, unlike the supporters of the anti-Islamization discourse maintain as stipulated above (see Section 3), still have the right to believe in it and practice it, as long as it shares some basic foundations with the modern liberal democracy as exemplified in the Dutch constitution.

A third important observation regarding the distinction between Muslims and Islam derives from article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance” (United Nations n.d.) Muslims are thus entitled to exercise their religion or, for that matter, their ideology. The Netherlands endorse the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as such suggesting or even forcing people to give up their religion goes against this basic human right. If the anti-Islamization program were to become a political reality this would mean that the Netherlands would have to abolish key articles of their constitution and terminate their commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

It is obvious that all this is highly undesirable and most importantly it shows that the character of the Islam/Muslims distinction is far from innocent. Modern democratic societies like Dutch society are blessed with free speech, allowing the anti-Islamization discourse to be freely expressed. But regrettably history teaches us that words spoken freely can eventually lead to deeds of exclusion and repression. Therefore, modern democratic societies have to remain vigilant and continue to protect all of their citizens.

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La distinction entre l’islam et les musulmans dans le discours néerlandais anti-islamisation

Cet article discute la distinction entre l’islam et les musulmans faite par les partisans néerlandais du discours anti-islamisation, qui leur permet de prétendre qu’ils ont de sérieuses réserves quant à l’islam, mais non quant aux musulmans. Il s’agit d’analyser cette distinction telle qu’elle paraît dans ce discours et de décrire les conséquences possibles pour ceux qu’elle vise : les musulmans habitant les Pays-Bas. L’article prend à témoin les écrits de Geert Wilders, chef du *Partij Voor de Vrijheid* (PVV, « parti de la liberté ») et de Martin Bosma, l’idéologue de ce parti, et présente une analyse de leur contenu, se concentrant sur la distinction islam- musulman comme élément essentiel de ce discours. Nous discutons la définition de ce discours et la relierons au terme « islamisation » et le terme apparenté « islamophobie,» et la manifestation des deux dans le discours de Geert Wilders et de son parti. Nous démontrons que le parti compte « tenter » les musulmans de renoncer à l’islam et ainsi créer un Pays-Bas sans islam – ce qui revient à dire : un Pays-Bas sans musulmans.

Het onderscheid tussen Islam en Moslims in het Nederlandse anti-Islamiserings-debat

Dit artikel heeft als onderwerp het onderscheid dat gemaakt wordt, door Nederlandse supporters van het anti-Islamiseringsdebat, tussen Islam enerzijds en Moslims anderzijds. Dit onderscheid stelt hun in staat te zeggen dat ze weliswaar van alles tegen Islam hebben, maar niets tegen Moslims. Centraal in deze bijdrage staat ten eerste een analyse van het onderscheid Islam/Moslims zoals dit gemaakt wordt in het debat en ten tweede een beschrijving van de mogelijke consequenties voor de mensen om wie het gaat: in Nederland woonachtige Moslims. Het artikel neemt in het bijzonder de geschriften van de leider van de Nederlandse Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) Geert Wilders en partij-ideoloog Martin Bosma onder de loep en biedt een analyse van hun inhoud met nadruk op het Islam/Moslim onderscheid als een essentieel element van deze anti-Islamiseringsretoriek. Het artikel behandelt de definitie van het anti-Islamiseringsdebat en legt verbanden met de term Islamisering en de gerelateerde term Islamofobie, en hun manifestatie in de argumentatie van Geert Wilders en zijn Partij Voor de Vrijheid. Het artikel laat zien dat deze partij als doel heeft Moslims te “verleiden” tot het afzweren van Islam en daardoor een Nederland zonder Islam te creëren, wat in feite neerkomt op een Nederland zonder Moslims.